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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of 
thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against 
the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the de-
monstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns 
in English.
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RESUMEN: En este artículo consideramos una variedad de puzzles sobre los demostrativos en el lenguaje 
del pensamiento que le planteamos a Jerry Fodor en la última conversación filosófica que mantuvimos con él. 
Criticamos la solución kaplaniana en términos de índices que nos propuso Fodor, y en su lugar ofrecemos una 
explicación de los demostrativos en el lenguaje del pensamiento que es amigable con Fodor, la cual se basa en 
nuestra explicación de los pronombres demostrativos en el inglés.
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Introduction
The last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor was on the topic of demon-
stratives in the language of thought (LOT).1 We had raised for him the specter of Frege-
style puzzles with demonstratives as stymying his account of mental content, but he con-
vinced himself that a liberal use of indexing would solve these puzzles. Prima facie, his 
suggestion seems wrong in all the same ways an analogous position about demonstratives 
in natural language was wrong (as articulated in Kaplan (1989b), and discussed in his 
(1989a)). In what follows, we will review Kaplan’s efforts to solve Frege puzzles for natural 
language demonstratives, and Fodor’s strategy to try to extend these efforts to LOT. Along 
the way, we will articulate problems with both. And lastly, we’ll sketch a positive proposal 
(extending our account of the semantics of demonstratives in English, developed in Stojnić 
et al (2013, 2017)) and then show how it can be exploited to solve the Frege-style puzzles 
we presented Fodor for mental content. We want to note at the outset that there is a signif-
icant literature on the topic and a number of authors have weighed in with their own criti-
cisms and their own solutions of Frege puzzles for demonstratives in natural language and 
LOT, but we have neither the space nor is this memorial volume the proper venue for such 
explorations or disputes. So, we state up front that our goals are modest; namely, to focus 
on Fodor’s suggestion made to us in passing and to offer in its place a solution we deem Fo-
dor friendly. We begin with the problem.
The Problem
Imagine we are in a port, where a large ship, Enterprise, partially occluded by a block of 
buildings, is passing by. One interlocutor, ignorant of the situation, points to the bow on 
one side of the block, and then to the stern, on the other, while saying:
1. I doubt that (pointing to the bow of the Enterprise) is identical to that (pointing 
to its stern).2
According to the standard semantic account of the demonstrative “that” (Kaplan 1989b), 
the content of its occurrence is identical to the object demonstrated by the speaker.3 Ac-
cordingly, the first occurrence of a demonstrative in (1) picks out whatever is demon-
strated by the first demonstrative act concomitant with its use, and the second by whatever 
is demonstrated by the second act concomitant with its use. Since the speaker fails to no-
tice there is only one ship, Enterprise, the embedded, complement clause in (1) simply ex-
presses a proposition of self-identity. But no one could doubt the ship is self-identical! This 
is just a variation on Frege puzzles extended to demonstratives.4
1 See Fodor (1975, 2008) for the discussion of the LOT hypothesis.
2 This example is famously due to Perry (1977).
3 Whether it is a demonstration, or another parameter, e.g., the speaker’s referential intention, which 
fixes the content of a demonstrative, does not matter for present purposes. See, e.g., Kaplan’s (1989b) 
for an account that places the meaning fixing role on speaker intentions, rather than demonstrations.
4 See Frege (1892/1980) for the original version of the puzzle. 
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The Fregean solution of attributing distinct senses to co-referring expressions, how-
ever, cannot get off the ground here, since, as seems reasonable, the demonstrative “that” 
has a unique sense, and so, its two occurrences in (1) share the same sense and reference. 
Thus, from the standpoint of Frege, they are synonymous. But (1) is obviously making a 
claim which can be quite informative.5
Kaplan acknowledged the problem and offered a non-Fregean solution to the de-
monstrative version of the Frege’s puzzle by appealing to separate aspects of meaning: 
character and content. The character of an expression specifies its linguistic, standing 
meaning, say, for the demonstrative “that” that its referent, for any use, is the inanimate 
object the speaker is demonstrating.6 Formally, it is specified as a function from contexts—
comprising parameters of the utterance situation on which the interpretation depends, 
e.g., the world of utterance, the speaker, the time of utterance, the location of utter-
ance7—to contents—the semantic content of an expression on an occasion of use. Con-
tents, so construed, can be seen as a function from a circumstance of evaluation (com-
prising at least a world, and possibly a time, location and other parameters (Kaplan, 
1989b)) to extensions.8
The character of certain expressions is a constant function, marking them as not vary-
ing in interpretation with changes in a circumstance of use. A name like “David Kaplan” 
picks out David Kaplan on every occasion of use, regardless of context. However, the inter-
pretation of some expressions, like the first person pronoun “I”, varies with context of use, 
and so, their character is not constant: it’s a function from context to possibly different en-
tities: if you say (2), the proposition you express will be that you are hungry, but if another 
says it, the proposition expressed will be that this other speaker is hungry:
2. I am hungry.
Similar considerations apply to “that”, though there seems to be a difference: “that” is a 
true demonstrative, and “I” a pure indexical, in the jargon of Kaplan.9 This means that the 
standing meaning of “I”, but not of “that”, fully determines a referent on an occasion of 
use: “I” simply picks out whoever utters it. “That”’s standing meaning requires extra-lin-
guistic supplementation: an intention or a demonstration.
A distinction between the character and content of demonstrative expressions is rel-
evant to Frege puzzle in that, given this distinction, the latter is essentially exhausted by 
5 Obviously, such a Fregean account would struggle to explain the apparent direct referentiality of de-
monstrative thought. This primary point of disagreement separated Kaplan from Frege. 
6 This can be complicated in all sorts of ways to capture that demonstratives track distal/proximal dis-
tinctions (“this” vs “that”), or that they can be sensitive to intentions rather than demonstrations, etc. 
But these complications are orthogonal to our main point, and so we will ignore them.
7 It makes no difference to our main points whether all of these parameters are indeed contextual (as 
Kaplan 1989b), or whether context includes further contextual parameters that might be needed (e.g., 
standards of precision for gradable adjectives, etc.). As Kaplan puts it, a “context is a package of what-
ever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential 
expressions of the language” (Kaplan 1989b).
8 Things are more complicated if contents are structured, but this also is orthogonal to our main issue.
9 See Kaplan (1989a,b) for a defense of this distinction, though see Stojnić (2016, 2017, 2019a,2019b), 
Stojnić et al. (2017) for a criticism of it. 
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reference, while “cognitive significance” is relegated to the former.10 So, unlike Frege, who 
builds cognitive significance into content, Kaplan relegates it to character. To illustrate 
how the strategy is supposed to help, consider a case from Perry (1979).11 Suppose some-
one has been tracking a trail of sugar left behind by a shopper in a supermarket. Upon see-
ing herself in the mirror, not realizing it is she, she says, ‘She is the messy shopper’. But 
when she comes to realize it is she who is making the mess, she says, ‘I am the messy shop-
per’. Even though the occurrences of ‘she’ and ‘I’ have the same referent, and thus, the same 
content, the two utterances differ in cognitive significance, on this proposal, because of the 
difference in characters of ‘I’ and ‘she’—the standing meaning of the expressions—respec-
tively. But how is the proposal supposed to extend to (1)?
Supposedly, the English word ‘that’ has a unique character; so, if character is supposed 
to be the bearer of cognitive significance, how then can we explain the potential informa-
tiveness of (1)? It would seem Kaplan’s proposal doesn’t provide a way out of the puzzle 
surrounding cognitively significant utterances of (1). As noted, Frege, and those follow-
ing his tradition, take such examples to establish a need for richer, more fine-grained con-
tents that consist of senses (or modes of presentation). Since there is only one word “that” 
involved in this puzzle, this strategy would either require positing a single word with dis-
tinct senses, or more likely, positing an ambiguity for “that”. Others have taken such ex-
amples to indicate, instead, the need to individuate vehicles of demonstrative speech more 
finely (Lepore and Ludwig 2000).12 This account, too, would posit a kind of an ambiguity 
for “that”. Kaplan himself exploits what is essentially a version of the later strategy, main-
taining the character of a true demonstrative is only determined once coupled with a dem-
onstration; when coupled with different demonstrations, different characters, and so, cog-
nitive significances are determined.13 One way this can be represented in logical form is by 
associating different indices with distinct occurrences of the demonstrative in logical form, 
one for each demonstration, and so, for each character. Whether a use of (1) is informative 
depends on whether the sentence used is (1a) or its homonymous (1b):
1a. I doubt that1 ship (pointing to bow) is identical to that1 one (pointing to stern).
1b. I doubt that1 ship (pointing to bow) is identical to that2 one (pointing to stern).
10 Functional presentation of Kaplan’s semantics somewhat complicates the idea that content is ex-
hausted by reference, but in ways inessential for our purposes. We stick to Kaplan’s intended descrip-
tion of his system. See Kaplan (1989b) for discussion. 
11 Whether it helps is controversial, but we will not address this issue here. (See, e.g., Perry, (1977, 1979); 
Evans (1981).)
12 Most formal treatments of multiple demonstratives have resorted to subscripting the demonstratives 
in a formal representation. See, e.g., Burge (1974); Kaplan (1989b); Larson and Segal (1995); Lewis, 
(1972).
13 Kaplan’s (1989b) strategy posits an ambiguity in character: the character of “that” is determined only 
once it is coupled with a demonstration: so, distinct demonstrations result in distinct characters. Inso-
far as the linguistic meaning of a demonstrative is incomplete, and requires extra-linguistic supplemen-
tation (a demonstration), one might understand this as underspecification, rather than lexical ambigu-
ity. However, the formal account is committed to a kind of ambiguity insofar as different occurrences 
of demonstratives receive different representations in the logical form. For a discussion see Kaplan 
(1989a), and Braun (1996).
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In (1a) and (1b), both occurrences of a demonstrative pick out Enterprise, but (1b) can be 
informative, whereas (1a) not,14 because the two demonstrative expressions in (1b) can dif-
fer in character. And so, (1b) is something a speaker can use consistently as something she 
can wonder and/or disbelieve, whereas (1a) cannot be so used. This is because, instead of 
having separate occurrences of the English demonstrative “that” uniformly represented 
in (1), according to this suggestion, we have occurrences of separate homonyms potentially 
with distinct characters, namely, “that1” and “that2”.
Before evaluating this proposal, we turn to its extension by Fodor to LOT.
Demonstrative thought
Instead of demonstrative linguistic acts, Fodor’s interest lies with demonstrative thoughts. 
Paradigms are thoughts typically expressed by sentences like “That is lovely,” where, 
under normal conditions, the intended referent of ‘that’ is the most prominently pre-
sent object; as we’ve seen, its different occurrences can express different thoughts. Now, 
whereas the sentence contains the demonstrative ‘that’, the corresponding demonstra-
tive thought, presumably contains a thought constituent, ‘THAT’, which when mentally 
tokened, refers to some particular. What’s distinctive about these demonstratives is that 
they arguably form the most direct link between mind and world. The connection with 
the world is direct, and non-mediated (i.e., demonstrative concepts, like demonstrative 
expressions, exhibit direct referentiality, in the sense of Kaplan (1989b)). Thus, suppose 
someone is looking at distinct objects, a and b, and thinks to herself the Mentalese coun-
terpart of (3).
3. That is distinct from that.
The referent of the first occurrence of the demonstrative is a, and the second is b. Re-
gardless of this immediacy, demonstrative thoughts of the form ‘THAT IS (IDENTI-
CAL WITH) THAT’, where the occurrences of the demonstrative refer to one object, 
can presumably sometimes, just as in natural language, be informative, and not a mere 
14 There is a genuine question of whether an utterance of “That is that” can ever be used in a way 
that is essentially uninformative. Kaplan points out the demonstrative “that” seems to require a 
new demonstration with each occurrence. If two occurrences of a demonstrative are governed by 
a single demonstration, at least one has to be anaphoric (contrast “That is that” with “That is it-
self”). The point seems to be that, even if the speaker is uttering the demonstrative while perform-
ing a single pointing gesture towards an object, English doesn’t force occurrences of a demon-
stratives to co-refer. So, if they do, this is a mere accident. This would, in turn, suggest that each 
occurrence of a demonstrative (setting aside anaphora) requires a different index, corresponding to 
a demonstration, and hence, a different character. This yields what Kaplan calls “exotic ambiguity” 
in the use of a demonstrative (Kaplan, 1989b). We shall return to ambiguity below. For our pur-
poses, though, it does not matter whether one can use “That is that” uninformatively (i.e., whether 
one can express a form like (1a) with an utterance of that sentence). What matters is that one can 
use it informatively, which is a puzzle in itself. Hence, the task is to explain how we can use it to ex-
press forms like (1b). 
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application of self-identity. So, suppose the subject is looking through two small holes 
on an opaque screen, each attached to a tube, focusing each eye separately, looking at 
a single red dot on a white surface. The subject, then, is having an experience of quali-
tatively identical images, each of a red dot on a white background. Given this informa-
tion, for all the subject knows, she could be looking at one dot or two, depending on 
the angle of the tubes.15 This subject could think to herself the Mentalese counterpart 
of (4):
4. I wonder whether that is that.
where the first occurrence of the demonstrative picks out the dot seen through the left eye, 
and the second seen through the right one. Even though there is a single dot the subject 
is experiencing, she is not wondering whether self-identity applies. (This is the same type 
of puzzle we saw earlier. We could alter the Enterprise case to be about mental content as 
well.)
Whatever else the moral is, as with natural language, our treatment of demonstra-
tive thought must be more complicated than simply letting the object causally respon-
sible for the occurrence of the demonstrative itself be a constituent of the thought. One 
possibility might be to try to invoke Kaplan’s distinction between character and (seman-
tic) content again, letting content be exhausted by reference, while relegating “cognitive 
significance” to character. This strategy would seem to help with certain cases of indexi-
cal thought.16 When the messy shopper comes to realize it is she who was making the 
mess, she will think to herself the conceptual counter-part of ‘I am the messy shopper’. 
And even though the mental counterparts of ‘she’ and ‘I’ have the same referent, and 
thus, the same content, the two thoughts differ in cognitive significance, due to the dif-
ferent characters of the mental counterparts of ‘I’ and ‘she’ respectively. But, just as with 
Kaplan, in our demonstrative cases this proposal is also not obviously helpful, for, sup-
posedly, the mental counterpart of ‘that’ should have a unique character; thus, if charac-
ter is the bearer of cognitive significance, we cannot explain why ‘THAT IS THAT’ can 
be informative. Perhaps, this explains why Fodor told us he wanted to resort to indexing. 
With indexing, we cannot assume it is the same vehicle of thought flanking the identity; 
for distinct indices, m and n, ‘THATn’ and ‘THATm’ are naturally understood as tokens 
of different concepts or mental symbols, rather than that of a single concept. It is this 
distinction in indexing—an employment of a different vehicle, or a symbol with a differ-
ent character—that explains the difference in cognitive significance. And so, we cannot 
assume that the expressions flanking the identity have the same character, and same cog-
nitive significance.
So, in the Two Tubes case and the Enterprise example, the thought ‘THAT1 IS 
THAT2’ can be informative, since even though both occurrences of a demonstrative pick 
out the red dot or the Enterprise, how what is thought differs from how what would be 
thought by, say, the thought ‘THAT1 IS THAT1’, where both tokens of a demonstrative 
15 The example is a variant of Austin’s “Two Tubes Puzzle” (1990), which is a variant of a Frege puzzle, 
involving demonstratives.
16 See Perry (1979), in particular.
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in LOT also pick out the Enterprise, or the red dot.17 Instead of two separate tokens of a 
single mental symbol in (4), namely, the demonstrative ‘THAT’, we have two distinct sym-
bols tokened, namely, ‘THAT1’ and ‘THAT2’.18
Problems with indexing19
One worry this strategy faces for language and thought, already foreshadowed earlier in the 
text, is that “that” and “THAT” seem like an unambiguous word and a single concept re-
spectively, and not distinct homonymous words and concepts. But representing different 
tokens of a demonstrative with different indices treats “that” and ‘THAT’ as ambiguous. 
Start with the demonstrative “that”. If its character is its standing meaning, then if each in-
dexed demonstrative is associated with a different character, “that” is indefinitely ambigu-
ous—one meaning for each index. Likewise, we’d have to posit indefinitely many concepts 
‘THATn’, one for each index.
This strikes us as implausible. First, English seems to have one word, “that”, not indefi-
nitely many accidental homonyms. It’s hard to imagine a competent speaker who under-
stands the meaning of one instance of “that”, but fails to understand another. (By contrast, 
a competent speaker can know one meaning of “bank”, but not another.) Similar consider-
ations ought to hold for the concept ‘THAT’.
Furthermore, if “that” is ambiguous between differently indexed expressions, what de-
termines the distribution of indices for any given tokening? To see what’s at stake, consider 
an utterance of (5):
5. That it distinct from that.
Is its disambiguation “That1 is distinct from that2” or “That1 is distinct from that1”? The 
answer cannot simply depend on whether the demonstratives are co-referential—this 
would rule out (1), where the speaker is wondering whether something which, in fact, is a 
single ship, is a single ship.20 Perhaps, we could say that, for any n, the character of the de-
17 Again, we shall not worry about whether such thoughts can be uninformative, only about how they 
could be informative. As explained above, this in itself is a puzzle. 
18 As before, this suggests an ambiguity: ‘THAT1’ and ‘THAT2’ are naturally understood as tokens of 
different concepts or mental symbols, rather than that of a single concept; after all, recall, it is the 
distinction in indexing—an employment of a different vehicle, or a symbol with a different charac-
ter—that explains the difference in cognitive significance. One could, we suppose, as with linguistic 
expressions, subscribe to underspecification, according to which ‘THAT1’ and ‘THAT2’ are tokens 
of the one and the same, albeit underspecified, concept ‘THAT’, which has full character—or corre-
sponds to a complete vehicle—only once coupled with an index. Whether or not such an underspeci-
fication account is viable at the level of concepts, our main worries will apply equally to such an ac-
count as well. 
19 As mentioned earlier, Braun (1996) contains an interesting discussion of difficulties this approach 
raises in Kaplan’s framework for providing a semantics for (English) demonstratives.
20 Bear in mind one could in principle (finiteness limitations aside) have sentences with indefi-
nitely many occurrences of a demonstrative expression. (E.g., “That is that, which is that, which is 
that,…”.)
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monstrative ‘thatn’, or with a demonstrative concept, ‘THATn’, picks out the nth object 
demonstrated on an occasion of use or mental tokening respectively. On this scenario, in 
a given context, a use of ‘thatn’ is acceptable only if the speaker intends to pick out the nth 
object demonstrated in that context (if any), and similarly for her tokening of a demon-
strative concept, ‘THATn’. This suggestion is not without problems: for one, it is not clear 
that one can have repeated occurrences of a single demonstrative, say ‘thatn’, in a single 
context.21 Due to reasons mentioned earlier, it is not obvious a single demonstration, or 
demonstrative intention, can be associated with different tokenings of a demonstrative. 
(Recall, Kaplan (1989b) points out that, at least in English, when two demonstratives are 
linked to a single demonstration, or demonstrative intention, at least one seems anaphoric, 
as exemplified by the contrast between “That [pointing at a vase] will break, if that [point-
ing at a vase] falls” with “That will break if it falls.” It is not unnatural to think the same ap-
plies to the corresponding thoughts.) If so, this means each new tokening corresponds to a 
new expression.22
But there is a larger, though related, problem with indexing; it seems to saddle us 
with indefinitely many words and concepts—as many as there are n-s.23 This in itself is 
not yet a problem, since it is uncontroversial that there are infinitely many words (and 
concepts) a finite mind can grasp, where this is standardly explained on the assumption 
of compositionality (Fodor and Lepore 2002). But we need to settle that these purported 
ambiguities do not require infinitely many primitive concepts.24 So, can we invoke com- 
positionality to account for the meaning of each indexed expression? Prima facie, it 
might seem we cannot, since the semantic value of “that1” (or “THAT1”) doesn’t seem 
to be a function of the values of “that” (or “THAT”) and “1” (or “1”), in any natural sense 
relevant for the productivity of thought.25 We can, of course, specify a function that 
would obey compositionality: we could take the character of “that” to be a function from 
contexts to functions from indices to objects. Then, given a context C1,“thatn” is inter-
preted as a function that takes the index n and delivers the nth demonstrated entity in C1, 
21 See Kaplan (1989b) for a discussion of this worry. See also Braun (1996).
22 Note, further, it is unclear how to individuate contexts relevant for thoughts. If a context spans 
only a single sentence, inference will be difficult to capture (e.g., in principle, we might want valid 
instances of “That is round and red. Therefore, that is red”). But if a context can span an arbitrary 
number of sentences, it becomes difficult to tell, in a non-arbitrary way, when a new context begins 
and a previous one ends. On the present picture, it is the individuation of contexts that crucially 
factors into the individuation of expressions (e.g., whether we have a tokening of “THATn”, sensi-
tive to the nth demonstration of an old context, or the 1st demonstration of a new one). It is even less 
clear agents have a non-arbitrary way tracking such distinctions, let alone play the role of cognitive 
significance.
23 Though, see Levine (2010) for possible constraints on the number of indices.
24 We follow Davidson (2001/1966, 8-9) in saying an expression is a semantic primitive relative to 
a set of interpretable items iff its meaning is unpredictable from the meanings of members of the 
set.
25 Note that even on a Kaplanean story, the numerical index is supposed to contribute a mode of presen-
tation associated with a demonstration (or intention), and not a linguistically specified meaning of the 
index.
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if any.26 This essentially means “that” maps a given context to an assignment function: a 
(partial) mapping of indices to objects. In this case, “thatn” is complex, and its context-
sensitivity is inherited from the different assignment functions denoted by “that” in dif-
ferent contexts (we can assume that the numeral is a constant, delivering n for “n” in any 
context). Alternatively, we could treat “thatn”, not compositionally, but via a background 
semantic rule that specifies the meanings of all primitives at once: for any n in N and 
context c, “thatn” denotes the nth object demonstrated in c; otherwise, it is undefined. 
This would essentially interpret demonstratives as variables, along the lines of Kaplan’s 
(1989a, b) proposal.
Perhaps, such accounts can explain how to generate indefinitely many demonstra-
tive expressions in a compositional fashion. They still, however, posit rampant ambigu-
ity where there is seemingly none: at the level of logical form, or meaning representation, 
a seemingly unambiguous expression is represented in potentially indefinitely many dis-
tinct ways. More precisely, on the first account, the one invoking semantic composition, 
while the demonstrative itself makes an unambiguous contribution, it is incomplete, 
and requires composition with an index; but one and the same string “That is lovely” or 
“THAT IS LOVELY” can feature indefinitely many distinct indices, and so, the form is 
still indefinitely ambiguous.27 On the second account, meanwhile, different occurrences 
of a demonstrative are represented by different subscripted expressions, again allowing for 
a seemingly unambiguous “That is lovely” or “THAT IS LOVELY” to be indefinitely am-
biguous.
Further, both accounts fail to explain why, when we point to the bow and stern, won-
dering “Is that the same as that?”, the representation is “Is that1 the same as that2?,” rather 
than any other potential disambiguation, and further, how this affects the cognitive sig-
nificance so that such thoughts are not merely questioning the law of self-identity. While 
we don’t want to argue these considerations should be taken as decisive, knock-down ar-
guments against any kind of indexing strategy, they do make us pessimistic regarding a sat-
isfactory and explanatory implementation of an indexing account. At any rate, without 
attempting to settle the debate over its ultimately viability here (in particular, without fur-
ther exploring the question regarding the possibility of a productive, yet unambiguous, ac-
count of demonstrative meaning), we instead suggest an account that avoids ambiguity, as-
signs a single, uniform meaning, and does so in a way we think Fodor would have found to 
be a friendly emendation.
26 That is, we interpret “that” roughly as  λc.λn.f(n), where f(n) = cn where cn is the nth object demon-
strated in context c; or else, f(n) = #, where # is the undefined value. Presumably, this is the content 
of “that” in c, which combined with a numeral n delivers the content of “thatn”, the nth object demon-
strated, if any, or else #. Notice that this suggests “thatn” doesn’t have an interesting character, and in 
any case, not a context-sensitive one (it has different contents in different contexts, but all context-sen-
sitivity is inherited from “that”). 
27 It is worth reemphasizing that there is a further open question of what aspect of the token utterance or 
thought contributes the index, and how that determines its cognitive significance, in a way that distin-
guishes the cognitive significance of ‘thatm’ and ‘thatn’ (‘THATm’ and ‘THATn’), for distinct m, n.
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Back to Demonstrative Thought
Our suggestion, in short, is that an occurrence of a demonstrative ‘THAT’ in LOT re-
fers to whichever object is currently at the center of attention (in a sense to be explained 
presently).28, 29 So, if we observe objects a and b, and think to ourselves (6):
6. That is distinct from that.
Then, these two occurrences of the same perceptual demonstrative ‘THAT’ can refer to a 
and b respectively only if there is a change in focal attention between the two; namely, the 
first occurrence goes in tandem with promoting a to the center of focal attention, and then, 
the second follows a shift in attention which promotes b to the center of focal attention. 
This is our proposal in a nutshell. Before we can spell out its details, and explain how it 
tackles the Two Tubes case, we first survey some empirical data on perceptual attention.30
Early Vision, Perceptual Attention and Object Tracking
There are good reasons to think early stages of visual processing begin with some kind of 
mechanism of pre-conceptual object selection—a mechanism of non-conceptual refer-
ence—that links mind and world through a causal, as opposed to informational or seman-
28 Stojnić et al. (2017, 2013) provides an analogous account of demonstratives in English. However, the 
notion of the center of attention relevant for the interpretation of a demonstrative in English defended 
there is not determined by a psychological notion of attention, but a linguistic one, where what’s at 
the center of attention, in the relevant sense, in a discourse is determined through a set of convention-
alized linguistic rules. Since here we are only interested in thought, and specifically in perceptual de-
monstrative thought, we will focus on perceptual attention. How this notion of attention relates to 
the linguistic notion of attention we discuss in prior work, and whether there is an analogue of linguis-
tic attention that determines the interpretation of demonstratives at the level of thought in mental 
counterparts of discourses (such as “John came in. He sat down”, where the demonstrative pronoun 
is resolved to the individual made prominent by the prior discourse) is a complex issue we cannot ad-
dress here. We note that we should allow for the possibility that a given use of a linguistic demonstra-
tive can fail to pick out an object the speaker is simultaneously successfully picking out with a token of 
a mental demonstrative. Even if Fido is the center of one’s visual attention and is successfully picked 
out with a token ‘HE’ in mental representation ‘HE SAT DOWN,’ if the thinker says “John came in. 
He sat down”, this use of the linguistic expression “he” will pick out John, regardless. It is also worth 
pointing out that, though we focus on perceptual demonstratives and so perceptual attention, we see 
no in principle obstacles to extending our account to demonstrative thought involving other percep-
tual modalities, or non-perceptual cases (e.g., using ‘THAT’ to select something accessible through 
memory). We suggest the extension would exploit analogue of visual attention in these modalities, but 
we refrain from attempts to extend our account to such cases in the present paper. 
29 One might object, Why think there is a current center of attention? Aren’t we typically attending 
to more than one thing? But on this account, mustn’t we posit reference failure whenever we attend 
to more than one thing? Our account will indeed have to be made consistent with the possibility of 
multi-focal attention. We will gesture towards a solution that respects this below.
30 A related account to ours is Levine (2010), who likewise focuses on the role of attention. However, 
there are important differences between the two, which will be relevant for giving a unique unambigu-
ous representation of a demonstrative on each of its occurrences. We will elaborate below.
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tic, relation (Pylyshyn, 2009, 1989; Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988). We briefly mention some 
evidence for this hypothesis.
Consider the Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) Experiment, as described by Pylyshyn 
and Storm (1988). In the basic experiment (represented in Figure 1, borrowed from Scholl 
(2009)), subjects are shown 8 to 12 identical objects on a display. Some are then briefly 
made salient, and indicated as targets (e.g. by blinking, as demonstrated in Figure 1(a)). 
All the objects then start moving unpredictably around the display (Figure 1(b)). After ap-
proximately 10 seconds the motion stops, and the subject must identify the initial targets 
(by highlighting them with a cursor, as in Figure 1(c)).
Figure 1
Experiments show humans can track up to five targets within the display with 10 iden-
tical independently moving objects; once this number is exceeded, performance signifi-
cantly deteriorates. Importantly, as Pylyshyn argued at length (2009, 1999, 1989) the ex-
periments suggest that the early vision system must be able to individuate and keep track 
of these visual objects without using an encoding of any of their visual properties. Note 
that if this tracking were appealing to some descriptive information, it would have to be 
sustainable under a description of the objects’ location at a time alone, since they are oth-
erwise identical. But, since the objects are in constant unpredictable motion, their loca-
tions are constantly changing; to track them by keeping track of, and updating, their re-
spective locations, one would have to have a way of storing and updating their respective 
locations. As Pylyshyn (2009; 1989) and Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) argue, it is implausi-
ble that this strategy is employed, since, even under liberal assumptions about the speed of 
attentional shifts that would have to be involved, we would not be able to account for the 
observed performance (subjects perform with over 85% accuracy, and the proposed model 
would predict the best performance would be around 30%). This suggests that tracking is 
achieved without recourse to descriptive or conceptual information of the targets.31
Pylyshyn’s conclusion is further supported by the fact that performance does not drop 
off with an increase in the number of targets up to 5, but does significantly with more than 
5 targets. Pre-conceptual processing typically shows this kind of a pattern of uniform per-
31 It’s striking that subjects can successfully track targets even when all their qualitative properties have 
been changed, or when the moving target disappears and reappears as if going behind an occluding sur-
face (but not if the motion is discontinuous). (See Pylyshyn 2009.)
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formance up to the limits of the system’s capacities, followed by a sudden drop-off; concep-
tual processes, by contrast, exhibit a gradual decrease in performance with a corresponding 
increase in complexity and the number of tasks (e.g., tracking a single target, as opposed to 
tracking two, three, etc.).32
To explain this sort of tracking without recourse to properties of the targets tracked, 
Pylyshyn (1989; 2003; 2009) suggests the visual system contains a mechanism of non-con-
ceptual ‘visual indexing’, which enables the system to reference and track multiple distinct 
targets through time. The human early visual system is equipped with (up to five simulta-
neously active) visual indices (FINSTs) that are activated, or ‘grabbed’ by salient targets in 
the environment (e.g., targets rendered salient by ‘flashing’ in MOT).33,34 FINSTs provide 
symbols connected to the world through a causal, not semantic, mechanism. Only after tar-
gets have grabbed FINSTs can the system cognitively access them, and direct focal or selec-
tive attention towards them.
Pylyshyn (2009) cites an abundance of evidence that the primary unit of selec-
tion by FINSTs (or a unit of ‘FINSTing’) is objecthood, as opposed to regions of 
space. This means that what gets selected by FINSTs is roughly co-extensional with 
physical objects in our world; crucially, however, the correlation need not be perfect, 
precisely because  FINSTing is not achieved through an application of a conceptual 
category (say, ‘OB JECTHOOD’), but rather through a purely causal relation. Conse-
quently, although what’s selected by FINSTs tends to correspond to physical objects 
in our kind of world, FINSTs do not select these objects qua physical objects, and can 
thus sometimes fail to grab individual objects. One way to think about it is this: sup-
pose we think of conceptual information associated with an object as contained in an 
object file associated with that object (cf. Kahneman et al, 1992). Then, one can think 
of FINSTs as mechanisms through which an object file is associated with the object it 
is about to begin with, if any (where crucially that association does not appeal to any 
conceptual information contained in the object file—not even that it falls under the 
concept ‘OBJECTHOOD’).35
If these findings are on the right track, the first stage in vision begins with a non-
conceptual connection between mind and world—the FINST mechanism. Only once 
such a non-conceptual connection is established does the cognitive system gain access to 
32 The literature on the subject is vast, and our survey is cursory. However, many studies seem to cor-
roborate these conclusions. See Scholl et al. (2001), Sears and Pylyshyn (2000), and Pylyshyn (2009) 
for discussion and a more comprehensive list of references. See Scholl (2009) for a critical discus-
sion.
33 An anonymous referee points out that it might be confusing to talk about “targets” (which evoke 
something passive) doing the “grabbing” (which evokes an action), so we take a moment to clarify 
that the “targets” are targets in the context of the task: they are made into targets for the purposes of 
the task by ‘flashing’ which renders them salient; as a consequence of this ‘flashing’ the FINSTs are 
“grabbed” or activated. 
34 Pylyshyn (2009) argues the targets that activate FINSTs tend to correspond to physical objects in our 
world. However, since this mechanism is non-conceptual, the targets are not selected qua physical ob-
jects, and can, thus, at times fail to correspond to real physical objects. Pylyshyn thus calls them ‘visual 
objects’. We return to this point below.
35 For this characterization, and further critical discussion, see in particular Pylyshyn (2009). 
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 FINSTed objects, and can direct focal attention to them.36 But how does this help establish 
the referents of perceptual demonstratives?
Attention and Perceptual Demonstratives
In our earlier sketch, we proposed that the referent of a demonstrative expression is that 
object (if any) currently at the center of attention. If the model sketched in the last section 
is on the right track, the most primitive mind-world connection is established through a 
pre-conceptual mechanism of FINSTing, whereby targets that grab FINSTs become acces-
sible to higher cognitive processes, and become potential targets of focal, or selective, atten-
tion. For a candidate object a to be the referent of a perceptual demonstrative, a must first 
become a target that activates, i.e. g, grabs, one of the FINSTs and second, selective, focal 
attention has to be directed to this FINSTed target. Why do we need both requirements?
The first should be easy to understand. The FINSTing mechanism, on this model, pro-
vides the most primitive, non-conceptual form of mind-world connection that allows for 
concept application—or, put another way, it is the mechanism through which an object file 
is connected with the object it is about (if any). If a system has no access to the object, that 
object cannot be a part of the content of conceptual thought; since this access is achieved 
(at least for visual objects within the perceptual circle) through a mechanism of non- (or 
better, pre-) conceptual contact, a pre-conceptual connection is needed for concept appli-
cation.
The second requirement is more complicated. Why do we need selective, focal atten-
tion in addition to a primitive non-conceptual connection to fix the referent of a demon-
strative? Why isn’t a non-conceptual connection sufficient? In its favor, there would be 
nothing more to applying a perceptual demonstrative than FINSTing the object. But this 
suggestion isn’t going to fly because FINSTs are pre-conceptual (non-conceptual), whereas 
thought involving a perceptual demonstrative is conceptualized, involving the application 
of a perceptual demonstrative concept, say, ‘THAT’. Although the demonstrative ‘THAT’ 
may have limited or impoverished descriptive content, still thoughts involving this con-
cept are nonetheless fully conceptualized. To see this, focus on other (perceptual) demon-
stratives (e.g. ‘HE’, ‘SHE’, etc.), which manifest the same dependence upon a (perceptually 
available) situation as the demonstrative ‘THAT’, and seem to function in analogous ways, 
yet carry a richer descriptive content (associated with gender, number and person con-
straints). Clearly, thinking of an object under the concept ‘HE’ makes use of properties as-
sociated with that object, in sharp contrast with the passive mechanism of FINSTing.
On the other hand, even after distinguishing perceptual demonstratives from non-
conceptual mental symbols (FINSTs), we might still think a causal, non-conceptual con-
nection achieved through FINSTing suffices to establish the referent of a perceptual de-
monstrative. But, then, why not just say the referent of a demonstrative is that object that 
occupies an appropriate position in the causal chain resulting in tokening the demonstra-
tive? The problem here is the same one we began with: recall the Two Tubes case—where 
36 For further discussion of the relation between FINSTs, perception, attention, and reference, see also 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015). 
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the referents of both tokens of a demonstrative (by stipulation) are one and the same; if we 
assume the demonstrative has a uniform representation on each tokening (i.e. that there is 
a unique, unambiguous demonstrative expression the tokens of which are featured in the 
relevant representation), then we are back to square one with respect to the problem with 
which we began. The relevant thought content is that a is identical to a, where a has been 
referenced via the same vehicle of thought twice. Yet the thought is non-trivial and inform-
ative.
To avoid this result, we need a more complex structure, and one is available. We have 
said before there is good reason to think FINSTs target what in our world corresponds to 
objects. What happens in the Two Tubes case, or the Enterprise example, however, is that 
one and the same object grabs, or activates, distinct FINST indices, thus, leading to estab-
lishing distinct object files; distinct non-conceptual mental symbols are associated through 
FINSTing with one and the same object (the red dot, or the Enterprise). In other words, 
the system treats one object as if it were two.
How does this help with puzzles surrounding the referents of demonstratives? In our 
problematic case, we have two (non-conceptual) mental symbols (causally, non-concep-
tually) targeting a single physical object. We can make use of these mental symbols in ac-
counting for problematic cases of the referents of demonstratives like the Two Tubes ex-
ample. What accounts for the cognitive significance of a thought involving perceptual 
demonstratives is that the referent at one end of the causal chain results in the relevant to-
kening of a perceptual demonstrative, together with the non-conceptual mental symbol—
or the FINST index—via which this reference is established. Now, since at any time, the 
system can have multiple active indices (and in our example, multiple indices connected 
to one and the same object), what makes one rather than another the index through which 
the reference of a token of a demonstrative is established? This returns us to our second re-
quirement. The answer is that the index through which reference is fixed is the one which 
guides the allocation of selective, focal attention at the occasion of tokening. The idea is 
that selective, focal attention plays the role of mental demonstration, which fixes the refer-
ence of the tokened perceptual demonstrative (concept). It focuses on the target, and the 
demonstrative references whatever is at the center of attention at the time of tokening.
Suppose the expression ‘@( )’ represents an operator that updates the center of focal 
attention, where @( ) directs focal attention to the item indexed by the index it operates 
on, and ‘f1’...‘fn’, as designating the FINST indices 1 to n, respectively. ‘@( )’ is thus a men-
tal counterpart of a pointing gesture—a way of shifting, or re-focusing attention.37 Then, 
where ‘THAT’ is a perceptual demonstrative concept (itself directly referential), the repre-
37 For an account of pointing gestures as linguistic mechanisms providing attention-shifting updates, 
see Stojnić et al (2017), and the formal implementation therein. As mentioned before, the account in 
Stojnić et al (2017) is designed to model a linguistic notion of center of attention in discourse, which 
is maintained through a set of linguistic mechanisms (pointing gestures including). On that account, 
something can be at the center of attention, in that sense, even if it is not psychologically most salient, or 
a focus of (joint) attention of the conversational agents (e.g., even if Betty, the cat is perceptually most 
salient and the focus of the conversational agents’ perceptual attention, if someone says “Mary came in. 
She sat down,” the referent of ‘she’ will be Mary nevertheless, because this referent is at the center of 
(linguistic) attention. 
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sentation for the potentially informative thought in the Two Tubes example is (7) below, 
which differs from the uninformative and trivial (8)-(9): 
7. @(f1) THAT is @(f2) THAT.
8. @(f1) THAT is THAT. 
9. @(f2) THAT is THAT.
In (7), the center of selective, focal attention shifts between two tokenings of a demonstra-
tive from one index to another. So, the two demonstratives are not guaranteed to co-refer. 
On the other hand, in (8) and (9), the attentional focus remains unchanged, and hence, 
different tokens of a demonstrative are forced to co-refer.38 The reference of a perceptual 
demonstrative is whatever is at the center of the selective, focal attention (if any unique 
thing is) at the time of the tokening. In (7)—(9), the subject is referring, by hypothesis, to 
a single physical object; however, it can still be informative that the object the subject is at-
tending to as one visual object, and a target of one visual index, is the same object as the 
one the subject is attending to as a distinct visual object, targeted by a distinct index. This 
is what it means to have an object be a target of two distinct FINST indices—the system 
treats the object as two distinct visual objects. This explains why (7), but not (8) or (9), can 
be informative.
We account for the thought in (3), where the occurrences of its demonstratives respec-
tively refer to distinct objects—a and b—in a similar fashion. Suppose f1 and f2 are acti-
vated by a and b respectively. We capture the thought in (3) as (10):
10. @(f1) THAT is @(f2) THAT.
Both occurrences of the demonstrative refer to what’s currently at the center of (focal) at-
tention. The reference of the first occurrence is established via the FINST index f1, which 
is a grabbed by a, and the reference of the second occurrence of the demonstrative is estab-
lished via the FINST index f2, activated by b.39
38 Earlier, we questioned whether different tokenings of a demonstrative expression can be guided by the 
same demonstration or intention. On our account of demonstrative concepts, this question can be 
rephrased by whether one can have constancy of focal attention between different tokenings of a de-
monstrative concept. Insofar as one can, the corresponding, uninformative thought (as in (8) and (9)) 
can ensue. It is important to note that this is a separate question from whether each token of the de-
monstrative expression in English requires a new demonstration/intention. Either answer to the for-
mer question is compatible with the possibility that each token of a demonstrative expression “that” in 
English might require a distinct demonstration (so that we don’t get the corresponding uninformative 
representations for tokens of the English sentence “That is that”).
39 One might worry that since our explanation relies on shift in focal attention to capture cognitive sig-
nificance, that in terms of what is going the shift appears to be a brute fact, that cannot be explained 
at the personal level by the difference in FINSTs at the subpersonal level. But even though FINSTs 
are subpersonal pointers, they provide input to cognitive processing at the personal level—e.g., stor-
ing information about FINSTed objects in respective object files, or directing attention to relevant vis-
ual objects that facilitates such processing. The cognitive significance associated with attention shift-
ing operators we posit in relevant mental representations that track distinctions at subpersonal level 
should not worry us more than the distinctions in conceptual content stored in respective object files 
that track connections to different FINSTs. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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We suggested that selective, focal attention could play the role of an accompanying 
(mental) demonstration, which in tandem with the demonstrative fixes the reference of a 
tokening of a perceptual demonstrative. But can attention suffice to supplement the mean-
ing of a demonstrative in fixing reference? One reason to think not is discussed by Levine 
(2010). He develops an account which, like ours, maintains that the selection of a target 
and attention, via FINSTing, are both necessary for establishing reference. However, he 
claims we need another operation, namely, the operation of mental demonstration, to fix 
reference, over and above what is delivered by attention. His reasoning is that subjects can 
simultaneously attend to more than one thing. Since demonstratives require uniqueness, if 
it were solely the selection of the target and attention that mattered for reference fixing, we 
would get a reference failure whenever the subject is attending to more than one thing.
There is good evidence that one can indeed attend to more than one thing at a time; 
one may think the Multiple Object Tracking experiment described above provides evi-
dence for precisely this possibility.40 We, in no way, intend to deny this. We are merely sug-
gesting that the process relevant for reference fixing a perceptual (singular) demonstrative 
requires selective,(uni-)focal attention, which can be targeted to each of the indexed tar-
gets, separately.41 This is entirely consistent with thinking that systems like ours can (and 
typically) do attend to more than one target at a time. So, the possibility of multi-focal at-
tention is in no way incompatible with the claim that focal attention plays a crucial role in 
establishing the reference of a demonstrative. It is sufficient that the subject can direct focal 
attention towards particular indexed targets, as seems to be so (Pylyshyn, 2009), for it to be 
possible to safeguard against reference failure due to a violation of uniqueness.42 It can still 
be that selective, (uni-)focal attention is required for demonstrative thought, even if crea-
tures like us can and do typically attend to more than one thing at a time. Since the relation 
of mental demonstration is posited to amend the alleged insufficiency of attention, it seems 
like no such relation need be posited.
At the same time, a more important distinction separates our view from Levine (2010). 
In postulating mental demonstrations, which serve as pointers to FINST, Levine seems to 
take them as mental demonstratives, or parts thereof. He writes: “The demonstrative con-
stituents in thoughts can thus be thought of as simply pointers to previously selected ob-
jects” (Levine, 2010, 179). A demonstrative constituent of thought corresponds to men-
tal demonstrations to corresponding percepts. So, according to him, the demonstrative is 
canonically represented as ‘→[α]’, which is a directly referential singular term referring to 
the object represented by the percept designated by ‘α’. But, this, from our standpoint, re-
creates the ambiguity we were trying to avoid: different tokens of a demonstrative concept 
need to be represented in non-uniform ways (corresponding to different percept-denoting 
symbols). On our account, by contrast, ambiguity is averted—the demonstrative concept 
always receives uniform, unambiguous interpretation. Ambiguity is averted because we sep-
arate, as seems to us correct to separate, the representation corresponding to a token of the 
40 Multiple object tracking is sometimes referred to as ‘tracking using multifocal attention’.
41 Perhaps, multi-focal attention is relevant for reference fixing for plural demonstratives. We cannot 
pursue this topic here.
42 And indeed, it seems to us plausible that in the split-attention case, without serial allocation of focal 
attention to distinct visual indices, one should expect reference failure for “THAT IS THAT,” just as 
one would were one to say “That is a cute dog” looking at park full of dogs, none particularly salient.
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demonstrative concept itself, from the attention-affecting operation that determines the 
reference of each token demonstrative.
Conclusion
We have sketched and partially defended an account of demonstratives in LOT that we be-
lieve captures our intuitions, while preserving direct referentiality and allowing for a uni-
form representation of the tokens of demonstrative concepts, thus, avoiding an unwelcome 
ambiguity. A demonstrative refers to whatever is at the center of selective, focal attention 
at the time of its tokening, where attention operates on non-conceptual representations—
FINST indices. Thoughts with distinct co-referential occurrences of a demonstrative con-
cept can be informative, so long as there is an appropriate shift in selective focal attention 
between them, which helps determine reference in tandem with each tokening of the de-
monstrative, by focussing on the relevant FINST indices in turn. This account is straight-
forward, and it is one, we’d like to think, Fodor would embrace.
REFERENCES
Austin, D. (1990). What’s the meaning of ‘this’? Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Braun, D. (1996). Demonstratives and their linguistic meanings. Noûs 30(2), 145-173.
Burge T. (1974). Demonstrative constructions, reference and truth. The Journal of Philosophy 71(7), 205-
223.
Davidson, D. (1966). Theories of meaning and learnable languages. In D. Davidson (2001). Inquiries into 
truth and interpretation (pp. 3-16). New York: Clarendon Press.
Evans, G. (1981). Understanding demonstratives. In H. Parret, & J. Bouveresse (Eds.). Meaning and under-
standing. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in G. Evans (1985). Collected papers (pp. 291-321). Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. A. & Lepore, E. (2002). The compositionality papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2015). Minds without meanings. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Frege, G. (1892). On sense and reference. Translation by M. Black. In P. Geach and M. Black (Eds. and 
Trans.) (1980). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (3rd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., & Gibbs, B. J. (1992). The reviewing of object files: Object-specific integration 
of information. Cognitive Psychology 24(2), 175-219.
Kaplan, D. (1989a). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (Eds.). Themes from Kaplan (pp. 
565-614). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, D. (1989b). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (Eds.). Themes from Kaplan (481-
563). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Larson R. & Segal, G. (1995). Knowledge of meaning. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Lepore, E. & Ludwig, K. (2000). The semantics and pragmatics of complex demonstratives. Mind 109(434), 
199-240.
Levine, J. (2010). Demonstrative thought. Mind & Language 25(2), 169-195.
Lewis, D. K. (1972). General semantics. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.) Semantics of natural language 
(pp. 169-218). Boston: D. Reidel.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. The Philosophical Review 86(4), 474-497.
Una Stojnić, Ernie Lepore
92 Theoria, 2020, 35/1, 75-92
Perry J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs 13(1), 3-21.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1989). The role of location indexes in spatial perception: A sketch of the FINST spatial-in-
dex model. Cognition 32(1), 65-97.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual 
perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(3), 341-423.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2003). Seeing and visualizing: It’s not what you think. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2009). Perception, representation and the world: The FINST that binds. In D. Dedrick & 
L. Trick (Eds.). Computation, Cognition and Pylyshyn (pp. 3-48). Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. & Storm, R. W. (1988). Tracking multiple independent targets: evidence for a parallel 
tracking mechanism. Spatial Vision 3(3), 179-197.
Scholl, B. J. (2009). What have we learned about attention from multiple-object tracking (and vice versa)? In 
D. Dedrick & L. Trick (Eds.). Computation, cognition, and Pylyshyn (pp. 49-78). Cambridge, MA.: The 
MIT Press.
Scholl B. J., Pylyshyn Z. W., & Feldman J. (2001) What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in 
multi-element tracking. Cognition 80(1-2), 159-177.
Sears C. R. & Pylyshyn Z. W. (2000) Multiple object tracking and attentional processing. Canadian Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 54(1), 1-14.
Stojnić, U. (2016). Context-sensitivity in a coherent discourse. (Ph.D. thesis). Rutgers University.
Stojnić, U. (2017). One’s modus ponens: Modality, coherence and logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 95(1), 167-214.
Stojnić, U. (2019a). Content in a dynamic context. Noûs 53(2), 394-432.
Stojnić, U. (2019b). The logic and grammar of prominence. (manuscript)
Stojnić, U., Stone, M., & Lepore, E. (2013). Deixis (even without pointing). Philosophical Perspectives 27, 
502-525.
Stojnić, U., Stone, M., & Lepore, E. (2017). Discourse and logical form: Pronouns, attention and coherence. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 40(5), 519-547.
Una Stojnić is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University.
aDDress: Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall. Princeton University, Princeton, 
NJ 08544-1006, USA, ustojnic@princeton.edu
ernie Lepore is a Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy, and a Distinguished Professor of Philoso-
phy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University.
aDDress: Philosophy Department, Rutgers University-New Brunswick, 106 Somerset Street, 5th floor, 
New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA, lepore@ruccs.rutgers.edu
